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Abstract 
Adam Smith (1776) devoted the first three chapters to the division of labor in his Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. This process, carried far enough, eventually results in a 
divergence between the distributions of supplies and demands of such horizontally-differentiated 
distinct types of human capital embodied in different persons, leading to the emergence of Embodied 
Human Capital Unemployment. We illustrate the relevance of this new concept of unemployment to 
the U.S economy in the first decade of the 21st Century. This helps achieve a deeper understanding of 
the current global economic crisis, and inter alia to identification of potentially effective, and 
potentially ineffective, public policies. (111 words). 
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Embodied Human Capital Unemployment 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Unemployment of persons who want to earn income from sale of their labor services, but fail in 
their attempt to do so, occurs due to distinct reasons, often simultaneously. The root cause, however, is 
material to the effective remedy. In this communication, We identify distinct types of unemployment 
on the basis of their respective original causes, so as to distinguish the public policies that will be 
effective, from those that will prove ineffective, in alleviating the adverse consequences suffered by 
unemployed persons and their dependents. 
In particular, we provide a simple model, which is an N-sector variant of the Specific-factors 
model developed by Ron Jones (1971), with endogenous international capital mobility as modeled by 
Peter Neary (1995), and a fixed co-efficient technology, to provide grounds for distinguishing among 
(1) Marxian unemployment that, according to Joan Robinson (1937), arises from a shortage of 
productive capital for workers to work with, (2) Keynesian unemployment, which arises due to a 
shortage of aggregated demand for final commodities, and (3) the emergence of a new face of 
unemployment, more predominant in modern economies, that arises because a divergence between the 
distribution of supplies and the distribution of demands of horizontally-differentiated distinct types of 
human capital embodied in different persons, a phenomenon which may be called, for want of a better 
name, Embodied Human Capital Unemployment. The emergence of EHC unemployment is a natural 
consequence of a continual increase in specialization and division of labor. In his Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (1776) found the division of labor, and inter 
alia the specialization of workers, to be so crucial a phenomenon for economic growth in capitalism 
that he included ‘the division of labor’ in the title and content of all three of the first chapters of his 
book. In modern economies, especially of the United States, individual persons are now so highly 
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specialized in distinct fields that crossing lines of productive activities has become both very expensive 
and quite time consuming. It is precisely to such a widely-differentiated spectrum of the supply of 
workers in an economy that this paper is addresses.1  
After developing the theoretical framework (in Sections 2 and 3), we illustrate the relevance of 
this concept of unemployment to the U.S economy in the first decade of the 21st Century (in Section 4), 
so as to obtain a deeper understanding of the global economic crisis, and inter alia to identify those 
public policies that could potentially, though only over time, mitigate wide-spread human torment 
suffered during this crisis. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks. 
To motivate the idea, first consider Marxian unemployment. Human beings typically do not 
work with their bare hands to produce output of commodities that are valued by people. A farmer needs 
a plough, just as a hunter needs a spear or a stockbroker needs streaming quotes on a computer screen. 
A plough and a spear and a computer are capital goods because, by definition, they are human-made 
tools and implements of production that have functional instrumental value only insofar as they can be 
used by a worker to produce final commodities that do, in fact, have constitutive value to persons. 
If there are ten hunters and ten spears than all of them can go about their productive work. 
However, if three spears are sent to another tribe, then seven hunters can get some meat, while the 
other three would be left standing unemployed.2 This is Marxian unemployment. And if an 
expansionary fiscal policy is adopted by the government of this tribe, more supply of meat will not 
come forth, but it will only serve to create inflation. There simply isn’t enough capital to employ all 
workers: more is needed. 
On the other hand, if three of the ten hunters are unemployed because the aggregate demand for 
meat in the tribe is fully satisfied by the output of seven hunters, the arrival or more spears in addition 
                                                           
1
 A plasma physicist, for example, cannot be converted costlessly or instantly into a material-science engineer, let alone into 
a neurologist or a social choice theorist, and conversely.  
2
 Of course, this is based on the assumption that there are no berries around to be picked, or any other such activities that the 
tunneled-vision hunters can engage in. 
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to ten, will simply not lead to the employment of the remaining three. Effective public policy would not 
be production of more capital goods but an expansionary fiscal policy, because the root cause of this is 
the insufficiency of effective demand, and thus the unemployment is Keynesian in nature. 
It should be noted that, compared to a state in which there is enough capital to employ all 
workers, in a different state that is characterized by Marxian unemployment, there will also arise 
Keynesian unemployment as a consequence, because those who remain unemployed will not have the 
income to demand final commodities. Similarly, Keynesian unemployment will lead to the emergence 
of Marxian unemployment, as lower demand for final goods leads to the shutting down of factories. 
The origin of unemployment in Less Developed Countries is typically Marxian even though the 
Keynesian type is also present as a consequence. On the other hand, in the Great Depression of 1929 – 
36, the cause was Keynesian unemployment and the effect was Marxian. 
In the first decade of the 21st Century, the U.S. economy is characterized by both Keynesian and 
Marxian unemployment, but these are both effects, as we shall explain presently, while the root cause is 
Embodied Human Capital unemployment. This, however, is not the case in most of Europe and Asia, 
for example, again, as explained in Section 5. 
 
2. Model 
The model we develop here draws on Batra and Naqvi (1989). Assume that in an economy, N 
commodities are produced in the quantity   ,  = 1, … , 	. The production function is 
 
(1)  = 
 , ,     
 
With the requirements that  
0 ,  = 
 , 0 = 0, 
 ,  > 0, 
  ,  < 0 for 
commodity i, where 
 ,  is concave and linearly homogeneous in both arguments, which implies 
that the inputs are cooperative, viz., 
  ,  =  
  ,  > 0. 
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Assume further that the Inada conditions hold, and that  is constant insofar as it is invariant to 
.
3
 Here,  is the quantity of homogenous productive capital demanded and employed in industry , 
with ∑  =   as the aggregate demand and employment of capital in the economy, and  is the 
quantity of sector-specific labor of horizontally-differentiated skill type  demanded and employed in 
the production of commodity . 
Assume further that each industry is perfectly competitive in both commodity and factor markets. 
Let this be a small open economy, both in commodity and capital markets, so that it takes the price of 
each commodity  , and ∗ the world rental rate of capital, as exogenously determined on world 
markets, whereas  is the endogenously determined wage rate of workers of skill  . Then, we have the 
following, 
 
(2)  
  ,  =  ∗ , ∀  = 1, … , 	  
and 
(3)  
 ,  =   , ∀  = 1, … , 	 , 
 
as the relationships that constitute the conditions that the  values of marginal product of each factor 
equal their respective factor prices, with the additional requirement that in the initial Walrasian general 
equilibrium, all workers are fully employed, so that  =    , ∀  = 1, … , 	, where   is the inelastic 
supply of workers of skill category  in the economy.  
Given the world rental rate of capital ∗, the employment of capital in sector , and thus the 
aggregate employment of capital K in the economy is endogenously determined by international capital 
mobility. However, labor of every skill type is, by assumption, internationally immobile. 
                                                           
3
 Here   is the minimum amount of capital required to employ a worker of skill type  in Sector . 
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With the assumptions specified, a Walrasian competitive general equilibrium exists, it is 
unique, and it is stable under a wide array of adjustment mechanisms if all commodities are strong 
gross substitutes. 
Let   be the real-income cost of educating-and-training a new entrant in the labor force to 
acquire sector-specific skills and become employable with skill  in sector , and let  !  be the cost of 
re-training a worker of type v with skill  to acquire skill " so as to become employable in sector ", and 
assume that   ,  ! > 0, with v to be specified presently. 
 
3. Emergence of Embodied Human Capital Unemployment 
Suppose this economy receives an external sizable, not infinitesimal, structural, shock. In 
particular, a rental rate of capital of ∗∗ > ∗ suddenly becomes available in a subset of productive 
activities for those capital owners who are willing to relocate their capital abroad, which they 
immediately do. 
More formally, partition the N productive activities into  = 1, … , #, some positive production 
of which is financed abroad by capital exported by the home country, while some non-negative 
production of these commodities, in smaller quantities, may still takes place in the home country when 
r** comes to prevail. The rest of the activities  = # + 1, … , 	 are the internationally non-traded 
activities, such as the services of nurses and school teachers that require contact between the provider 
and the recipient.4 This changed structure of the economy is reflected in (2) being replaced by 
 
(2a)    
  ,  =  ∗∗ >  ∗ , ∀  = 1, … , #, 
 and 
(2b)      
  ,  =  ∗ ,  = # + 1, … 	. 
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 These are activities,  = 1, … , #, are the ones that can be performed off-site from their source of demand in the home 
country. 
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With the constancy of , and with 
  ,  < 0, corresponding to a higher rental rate of 
capital ∗∗, a new non-Walrasian temporary-equilibrium value of  will arise, and this value must be 
lower ∀  = 1, … , #, which, in turn, implies, give constancy of  , that some skilled workers in each of 
these # sectors will be laid off. If the lower quantity of labor of skill type  demanded in sector  is %, 
then & =  − % > 0 will be the magnitude of unemployment of workers of skill category , as long as 
the wage rate  , ∀  = 1, … , #, does not adjust downwards fast enough to clear the labor market for 
labor of skill type i. A proxy for this sluggish adjustment in temporary equilibrium analysis is taken to 
be fixed prices, which is the type of exercise I undertake here, and the assumption that I make. And, 
this is not inconsistent with different quantities of workers with distinct types of embodies human 
capital in the new temporary equilibrium, in the non-traded sectors of the economy,  = # + 1 … 	, 
such as in healthcare and education.5 
There are many reasons why capital that has left the country will not return, even if wage rates 
ultimately fall for labor of skill type ∀  = 1, … , #. One such explanation is based on a hysteresis 
argument, according to which, there is a band on inaction, [) , * ] for agents, so that if the return to 
capital at home does not rise above an upper-bound * , or if this return does not fall below a lower-
bound ) abroad, capital owners will not bring about a reverse flow of capital back to the home 
country.6 
In addition, recall that  ! > 0 is the real-income cost of re-training a worker of type v with 
skill  to acquire skill " so as to become employable in sector ". Therefore, an aggregative expansionary 
                                                           
5
 Structural unemployment results as a temporary phenomenon due to a shock – internal or external – that an economy 
experiences, because some sectors contract, but subsequently other sectors expand to absorb those workers who lost 
employment in the sectors that contracted. This latter phenomenon of re-employment of workers who are laid off in the 
sectors that contract does not occur in the case of EHC unemployment, simply because they lack the skills required for 
employment in sectors that exhibit excess demand for labor. 
6
 The band of inaction emerges if (i) the return on capital is uncertain in either country (home or abroad) and this return 
follows Geometric Brownian Motion, and (ii) there is a one-time, positive cost of moving capital abroad or of bringing it 
back home. 
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fiscal policy, aimed at the entire economy at once, not a program of human-resource planning that 
carries incentives for the acquisition of specific types of human capital, will fail to convert a worker 
with skill  into a worker with skill ", thereby rendering fiscal policy ineffective.7 
But, this is not all. Suppose  ,! is the real-income cost that society or the government or a 
mechanism designer has concluded is an acceptable cost to incur for retraining a worker of type v, as 
part of a social goal. Then, (i) ∃.:  ! <  ,! , and (ii) ∃.:  ! >  ,! , rendering the second category of 
workers of type v un-trainable, from the point of view of society, even if they are willing to retrain, in 
which case they would unambiguously remain involuntarily unemployed, which is a conceptual issue – 
and a practical one – that has been found to be difficult to grapple with in the literature.8 The problem 
with the concept of involuntary unemployment faced in the past has nothing to do with unemployment 
per se, but rather with the content of the concept of involuntariness. Separating the motivation of the 
employment seeker from that of the employment provider or facilitator resolves the issue. 
Even for the first category of workers, who are socially deemed re-trainable, a well-funded 
implementation of a specifically-targeted human resource planning program, with incentives for re-
training, would constitute a remedy, rather than a program of indiscriminate increases in aggregate 
government net spending. Moreover, a schedule of socially acceptable re-training costs in a game-form 
could well be such as to monotonically increase with the number of years left to retirement or with the 
wage rate of the type of human capital to be acquired, or, of course, both.9 
This much, however, is quite clear. The remedy for Marxian unemployment, which arises as a 
consequence of EHC unemployment, will, by itself, fail to solve the problem of unemployment of 
                                                           
7
 For example, a 20-year veteran automobile assembly-line worker will not be transformed into a nurse or a school teacher 
by an expansionary fiscal policy.  
8
 In the first category could be a 25-year old person who has been on an automobile assembly line for a couple of years, and 
has 40 additional years before she is eligible to collect social security payments from a national retirement plan, while the 
second category could include a 60-year old financial analyst who has a mere five years to go before retirement age. It may 
not be unreasonable at all for society or a mechanism designer to decline re-training to the financial analyst and approve it 
for the automobile worker if, for instance, the retraining cost is  , = $200,000 for both. 
9
 The particular characterization of such an implementation mechanism is the subject matter of another paper, on which see 
Naqvi and Pech (2009). 
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distinct types of workers with embodied sector-specific human capital, the demand for whom is 
insufficient in relation to their respective supplies in the economy. Similarly, an expansionary fiscal 
policy alone, as already noted, will also fail in spite of the presence of Keynesian unemployment in the 
economy that again arises as a consequence of EHC unemployment. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Early retirement for some unemployed workers, and a specifically-targeted human resource 
planning program, with grants, loans and other incentives for education, training and skill acquisition, 
would have to form an inescapable part of a necessary policy package to remedy EHC unemployment. 
But this will take time. In the intermediate term, however, if the economy is not producing a 
sufficiently large number of educated workers of the skill categories that have an excess demand, 
immigration of foreign workers – temporary or permanent – who have such skills, is the only solution. 
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4. Application to the U.S Economy and the Global Economic Crisis 
Suppose the economy described in Section 2 is the U.S. economy, as it stood in late 20th 
Century, around 1995. In 2000-2001, due primarily to political decisions, the U.S. abruptly dropped 
virtually all commodity-trade barriers and capital-flow controls against China and India.10 This 
naturally created a super highway to low-wage heaven in these countries (with international wage 
differentials in the range of 10:1 to 20:1), on which American-owned capital travelled at break-neck 
speed, year after year, in increasingly large cumulative quantities, as shown in Figure 1 below. This had 
to have given a rather stunning shock to the American labor markets, which is a phenomenon ignored 
in academic discourse thus far in an examination of the American economy in the first decade of the 
21st Century, and which constitutes a serious omission that this note attempts to remedy. 
While in the initial years starting 2001, the increase in demand for labor in the expanding sectors of the 
U.S. economy offset the decline in the contracting sectors due to capital outflow to China and India, in 
the later years of this decade, the cumulative outflow became sufficiently high to reverse this trend, as 
indicated in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
10
 This was done by the U.S. granting China a permanent Most Favored Nation status in 2000, and by helping China to be 
inducted into the WTO in 2001 in Seattle. Similarly, starting late September 2001, erstwhile stringent commodity-trade and 
capital-control barriers against India were removed, in return for India agreeing to monitor sea lanes for terrorist activity 
from Singapore to the Suez. Manufacturing activity increased in China, financed by American-owned capital that relocated 
to China, and since India was a British colony, just like the U.S., a great many Indians are familiar with the English 
language, so that substantial Information Technology related activities were increasingly outsourced to India. While I 
describe the economic consequences of such decisions, I make no claim whatsoever as to the desirability, or otherwise, of 
such political decisions. 
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           U.S Foreign Direct Investment in China and India 
 
Figure 2 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, February 2009 
In addition, since job losses lead to a decline in aggregate income and thus spending 
(Commerce Department data show that in the fourth quarter of 2008, the U.S. GDP contracted at an 
annualized rate of 6.3%.), there consequently also arose Keynesian unemployment, so the U.S. 
unemployment rate started to climb from 4.2% in 2001 to 4.7% in June of 2008, to 8.1% by the end of 
2008, to 10.2% by September end 2009, and should be expected to continue to rise for a few years to 
come. 
Why will this happen? Why will the American economy take a long time to recover? First, 
there is a set of collective beliefs that have led to the unfortunate social outcome that in the U.S., out of 
every four, only one high school graduate finishes college, not to mention the fact that the U.S. also has 
the highest high school dropout rate among industrialized nations. However, in a modern economy, 
literacy – defined as knowing how to read and write (or ninth-grade education, on the World Bank 
definition) – is no longer sufficient to make a person employable. A college degree and minimal digital 
literacy are now basic requirements for a person to become employable in a modern economy, whereas 
the vast majority of Americans are simply not employable. It is not a matter of shortage of jobs. If it 
were, why would work be outsourced from the U.S. to India, among other countries? But rather, there 
is a shortage of American educated and skilled workers who are employable in a modern economy. An 
11 
 
important question to ask is: what are these other three high school graduates without college degrees 
going to do? Collective beliefs in any society are extremely tenacious, and very slow to change. It will 
take years before two out of four, or three out of four, high school graduates in the U.S. will finish 
college. Moreover, not only does it take four years to finish college on average, it also takes several 
years to train, or retrain, somebody to become a nurse or a school teacher, in addition to the substantial 
education and training costs that must also be incurred. In fact, in a speech before the joint session of 
Congress on February 24, 2009 President Obama admonished, 
In a global economy where the most valuable skill you can sell is your knowledge, a good education is 
no longer just a pathway to opportunity – it is a pre-requisite. 
 
Right now, three-quarters of the fastest-growing occupations require more than a high school diploma.  
And yet, just over half of our citizens have that level of education.  We have one of the highest high 
school dropout rates of any industrialized nation.  And half of the students who begin college never 
finish. 
This is a prescription for economic decline, because we know the countries that out-teach us today will 
out-compete us tomorrow. 
 
And so tonight, I ask every American to commit to at least one year or more of higher education or 
career training.  … By 2020, America will once again have the highest proportion of college graduates 
in the world. 
 
But this still is not all. We have already noted that it typically takes four years to finish college. In 
addition, given the uncertain return on private-sector financed education (simply because not all who 
start will finish college), and a positive cost of finishing college to become employable (in the model of 
Section 2, at a cost of   > 0 for skill ), the same hysteresis phenomenon (outlined in Section 3) that is 
keeping American-owned capital that left for China and India from returning, will keep the private 
sector from financing education, unless the government provides student-loan guarantees for higher 
education. That is why the current deprivation episode in the U.S. is likely to be protracted. 
Remedies that could have helped have been legislated out recently by the U.S. congress. This is 
especially so in the light of the clause in the $787 Billion Stimulus Package bill passed by the U.S. 
Congress in March 2009, popularly known as TARP, that requires that any institution receiving public 
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funds under this act is prohibited from hiring foreign workers, including skilled and educated foreign 
workers graduating from universities in the U.S. (job offers to whom are being rescinded by 
corporations that have accepted TARP funds). This is precisely the type of protectionist measure that 
will further exacerbate the problems facing the U.S. economy. 
Public works programs will certainly provide temporary relief to unemployed workers, but 
these are low-wage jobs that will simply not return the bulk of the middle-class residents of 2001 in 
America to their erstwhile status.11 And increase in interpersonal inequality of income is an inevitable 
consequence of the structural shock received by the U.S. economy, as in Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3 
                                                           
11
 In 1980, the top 1% income earners in the U.S. garnered 8% of the national income. By 2008, this figure had risen to 
24%. Further, the U.S. does not have any apprenticeship program of the kind that Germany has, which could have afforded 
a middle-class living standard to Americans. In the light of these facts, the middle class in the U.S. has dwindled, and for it 
to re-emerge, there is no escape from larger proportion of Americans attaining higher education and skills of the type that 
are in demand in a modern economy, as that of the U.S., where specialization and division of labor has been carried to the 
farthest extent in human history. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
There are four additional points worth noting. First, persons who become unemployed cannot 
typically make mortgage payments, they file for bankruptcy, and they lose their houses to foreclosures. 
This makes their loans in a Mortgage Backed Security (MBS) non-performing, thereby reducing the 
market value of the MBS of which these loans are a constituent part, in turn making the MBS what is 
now-a-days called a “toxic asset,” and institutions that have portfolios containing a substantial portion 
of their wealth in the form of MBSs become insolvent when their clients seek to withdraw their 
deposits. Thus, the financial crisis is the effect, not the cause, of the economic downturn, which started 
with the U.S. suffering a sudden and stunning jolt due to rapid capital out-flight, as a consequence of 
political decisions. Thus cleaning up the balance sheets of financial institutions is necessary, but it will, 
by itself, not suffice in pulling the American economy out of the current crisis. 
Second, while irresponsible and possibly irrational behavior may have played a role in 
originating the so-called “sub-prime” mortgages, it is not necessary at all to invoke such agency 
failures to explain the global economic downturn of the early 21st Century; structural change, by itself, 
suffices in accounting for it. In this sense, it is structure, not necessarily agency, which needs to be the 
object of examination. Placing blame on unscrupulous agents is unhelpful, and can actually lead to 
seeking remedies that would simply prove ineffective. 
Third, in the U.S., there first emerged Embodied Human Capital unemployment as a 
consequence of cumulative capital out-flight, which consequently induced both Keynesian and Marxian 
forms of unemployment. However, this is a new face of unemployment, so the remedies for the two 
latter forms of unemployment will not solve the problem. The process that led up to the economic crisis 
of 2008 in the United States was causally quite different from the other cases. And just because the 
symptoms appear to be the same, it does not follow that the causes, and thus cures, are too. If the 
original cause is not understood, remedy will be hard, if not impossible, to find. 
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The last point we would like to make is that the problems in the U.S. economy arose out of a 
structural shock due to abrupt capital out-flight, which induced Marxian unemployment and Keynesian 
unemployment as consequences. However, in the rest of the world, especially in Europe and Asia, that 
is not the root cause of the economic decline, even though the symptoms of rising unemployment 
across a wide array of skill categories appear to be the same. This is so because labor markets in 
Europe, Asia, South America, Africa and Australia did not experience adverse structural shocks due to 
capital out-flight, unlike the United States. Moreover, the sheer size of the U.S. GDP is very large in 
comparison with the GDPs of other countries.12 As a consequence, a fractional contraction in U.S. 
spending, such as the 1.58%  GDP decline in the fourth quarter of 2008 (or 6.3% annualized decline), 
amounted to a reduction of spending by $217 Billion. Similar contractions again in the next two 
quarters of 2009 sent not just waves, but a tsunami of import-demand reductions across the world, 
which in turn lead to thousands of factory closings (in China, among others), freezing of all 
construction activities (in Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine, for example), plummeting automobile sales 
world-wide (especially from the U.S., Japan and Germany) and soaring unemployment rates (from 
China and Russia to Spain and Mexico, among others). And, by the end of June 2009, the British 
economy had already exhibited the greatest annual shrinkage in half a century!13 
Hence the remedies for the countries other than the U.S. are not the same as the ones necessary 
for the United States. In fact, (1) these other countries are suffering from loss of asset values because 
they were holding once highly-valued but now with zero-market-priced American MBSs, about 50% of 
which were held in several Western European countries, and because (2) they have experienced a 
straightforward Keynesian contraction due to a reduction of American import demand. Thus for these 
countries, merely cleansing of the financial sectors, and expansionary fiscal policies to counteract 
                                                           
12
 In 2008, U.S. GDP stood at $14 Trillion, Japan $4 Trillion, China and Germany $3 Trillion each, then France, followed 
by the U.K., all the way to India in the 12th place with $1 Trillion, in that order. 
13
 All this has happened despite massive Central Banks’ nominal interest rates reductions: it is 0% – 0.25% in the U.S., 
0.25% for the Bank of Japan, 1% for the European Central bank, and the lowest rate in a more than 300-year history of the 
Bank of England, among others. 
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American import-demand contraction, should be expected to be effective in restoring economic activity 
to healthy levels, unlike the U.S., that also requires a well-funded and carefully-designed human 
resource planning program to be implemented, as noted by President Obama in his February 2009 
speech before the joint session of Congress. 
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Appendix 
 
1. A Miniature Model of the American Economy 
Let all economic activity in the American economy be divided into three broad sectors, the export 
sector, with a domestic output of X, the import-competing-good sector with domestic output M, and an 
internationally non-traded good sector with an output of N. We can, if it helps, think of X as the output 
of skilled services (IT, R&D, etc.), M as industrial output (of TVs, computers, refrigerators, cars, etc.), 
and N as the output of home goods (such as roofing services, health-care services, and so on), which 
require contact between a provider and the customer. 
 
Let the production function in the export sector be, 
 
 23 = 
4567 , 879 ,           (1) 
 
where SX and KX are the employment of skilled labor and capital, respectively, and F( ) is a concave 
and  linearly homogeneous production function with indispensable inputs and positive and diminishing 
marginal products.14 Similarly we can specify, 
 
 :8 =  ;43<  , 8<9 ,            (2) 
 
where LM and KM are the employment of unskilled labor and capital in the domestic production of 
manufactured goods, and G( ) is a similar production function.15 In the non-traded sector, the 
production function is 
 
 	8 = =43 , 569 ,           (3) 
 
Where LN  and SN , are the employment of unskilled labor (as roofers, for example) and skilled labor (as 
medical doctors, for example), respectively, and H( ) is again the usual production.  
 
In (1), (2) and (3), capital is internationally mobile, as well as intersectorally mobile across export and 
import-competing production sectors. Unskilled labor is only mobile between the import-competing 
and the non-traded sectors of the economy, and its supply is exogenously fixed. While skilled labor is 
intersectorally mobile between the export and non-traded sectors, it is internationally immobile, and its 
supply is perfectly inelastic.16  
 
We assume that all markets are perfectly competitive. That is, all three sectors are populated by many, 
though finite, firms that act as price takers in both commodity and factor markets. Further, all firms in 
each sector are cost-minimizing profit maximizers, and there is free entry and exit of firms in long-run 
                                                           
14
 For a two-input production function, concavity, constant returns to scale and diminishing marginal products together 
imply that inputs are cooperative, insofar as a larger employment of one factor induces an increase the marginal productivity 
of the other. That is, FSK = FKS > 0. 
A ‘hat’ over a variable denotes its endogenously determined general equilibrium value in the initial, pre-structural-shock 
state of the economy. 
15
 Throughout, we treat manufacturing workers as unskilled workers, not because they are completely unskilled, but because 
they are less so. 
16
 Agriculture contributes barely 2% to GDP and employs less than 1% of the labor force. This stylized fact is utilized in 
making some bold assumptions in the formulation of the model of the American economy, with the linkages to India and 
China to be specified presently. 
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Walrasian general equilibrium. Then, international mobility of capital implies that, in general 
equilibrium, 
 
7
4567 , 879 = ∗ ,            (4) 
 
where pX  is the exogenously specified world price of the country's export commodity, which one might 
recall is  IT services, FK  is the marginal product of capital, and  r* is the exogenously determined 
world rental rate of capital.17 
 
Similarly for the import-competing sector, international capital mobility implies that the value of 
marginal product there must also equal the same rental rate of capital that prevails in the world 
economy. Thus, 
 
 <;43< , 8<9 = ∗ ,         (5) 
 
where again, pM  is the world price of the manufactured good that this economy's import-competing 
sector takes as parametrically fixed, and GK  is the marginal product of capital in manufacturing. 
 
In the pre-shock state of the economy, the values of marginal product of unskilled labor in 
manufacturing and non-traded sectors must to be equal in general equilibrium, as is the case with the 
values of marginal products of skilled labor in the export and non-traded sectors. Thus, we have 
 
 <;43< , 8<9 = ̂=43 , 569 = ? ,        (6) 
 
and 
 
 7
@4567 , 879 =  ̂=@43 , 569 =  w? B        (7) 
 
where wL and wS are the economy-wide unskilled and skilled wage rates determined endogenously in 
general equilibrium. 
 
In (6) and (7), it is important to make a distinction between the pre-shock real-sector conditions that 
obtained, and the state of affairs post-shock. Thus we also have, 
 
  3M + 3N = L,           (8) 
where L was the fixed supply of unskilled labor, and (8) is its sectoral allocation before 2001, and 
 
   56X + 56N = S,           (9) 
 
where S was the fixed supply of skilled labor, with (9) as its sectoral allocation before 2002. 
 
Domestic demand and supply of the non-traded good sector determines the domestic price of the non-
traded good in equilibrium, so that, 
                                                           
17
 Notice that this r* is the effective world rental rate of capital that American entrepreneurs can avail of in general 
equilibrium, before they have access to much lower manufacturing and IT wage rates in China and India, respectively, and 
inter alia before they can avail of the consequent higher returns to capital investment in these countries (due to lower labor 
costs). 
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 C647 , < , ̂ , D39 =  	8̂ , ∗, ? , ?@,        (10) 
 
where Y is national income (or the GNP of the country), that is an argument of the domestic aggregate 
demand function for the non-traded good in (10), 
 
 D3 = 723 + <:8 + ̂	8 = ?43< + 39 + ?@4567 + 569 + ∗87 + 8<  (11) 
  
on the presumption that all human and physical capital employed in the country in the initial general 
equilibrium are domestically owned.18 
 
This completes the specification of the model, except for an explicit treatment of the currencies and 
foreign exchange rates, on which I comment in the Appendix I, and issues of interpersonal income 
distribution that I take up in Appendix II. 
 
2. Initial General Equilibrium 
To see how the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables are determined by the relationships of 
the model of the American economy, before the tsunami of 2.3 billion people hit the U.S., some 
pictures might help. These are presented in Figures 1 through 4 below. 
 
Notice that in the model, the exogenous variables,  are  pX , pM , r* and L and S, the world prices of the 
export good, the import-competing good (equal to the world price of imports), the world rental rate, 
and the inelastic supply of unskilled and skilled labor, respectively. To obtain the reduced form of the 
model, substitute for LN from the unskilled labor supply constraint (8) in (6), for SN from the skilled 
labor supply constraint (9) in (7), and substitute for Y from (11) in (10). With these substitutions, taken 
together with (4) and (5), (6), (7) and (10) are five equations in five endogenous variables: KX, KM, LM, 
SX and pN. These five relations uniquely determine the general equilibrium values of these five 
endogenous variables, and then the rest are obtained by appropriate substitutions.19 
 
Of course, in addition to the assumptions made about the structure of production, it is important to note 
that some additional assumptions have to be employed to guarantee the existence and stability of 
equilibrium. These are (I) the skilled and unskilled wage rates and the price of the non-traded good are 
perfectly flexible; (II) personal preferences are defined on the set of ordered triples of the quantities of 
the three commodities consumed by a person, and these preferences are represented by a binary of 
relation of weak preference that completely orders a finite set of alternatives. This relation satisfies the 
properties of strong monotonicity and convexity and continuity. 
 
These assumptions not only guarantee the existence of general equilibrium, but they also produce 
downward-sloping excess demand curves for all commodities and factors of production, so that under 
the a wide array of adjustment mechanisms, this general equilibrium is, in fact, stable. Of course, 
                                                           
18
 There are some issues related to the interpersonal distribution of endowments, and inter alia the distribution of income in 
the economy, with serious implications for both the interpersonal aggregation of commodity demands and for the 
assumption of interpersonal comparability of these personal demands, in the empirically significant case when the incomes 
are unequally distributed. This pertains to both descriptive and prescriptive matters. I take these up in Appendix II. 
19
 From (8) and (9) the values of 3N and 56N can be obtained. Substituting the value of all of these endogenously determined 
values in (1), (2) and (3) gives the general equilibrium values of the outputs of the three sectors, and from (6) and (7) we 
obtain the two wage rates. 
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because Walras law for markets holds, only relative prices are determined in general equilibrium. This 
solves the model completely, and a graphical solution is presented in Figures 1 – 4. 
 
3. Adjustment to Structural Shocks 
The stage is now set to subject this economy to a sudden exposure to 2.3 billion people, starting 2000-
2001, with vast numbers of low-cost unskilled, manufacturing workers in China (willing to work for 
wChina < ?L) and low-cost skilled workers in India (willing to work for wIndia < ?S ),  thereby offering 
to the American capital owners greater profit-income opportunities, if only they would move their 
capital to these countries to avail of significantly lower labor costs. 
 
Given lower labor costs, the rate of return on American-owned capital becomes higher, so that (4) and 
(5) change to (4a) and (5a), respectively, insofar as the values of marginal products in the Chinese 
manufacturing and Indian IT-related activities now equal r** > r* in China and India. Moreover, in the 
post-structural shock state, (6) changes to (6a) and (6b), and (7) changes to (7a) and (7b) below. All 
four of these changes constitute structural shocks, not infinitesimal changes. More on that presently, in 
Section 6. 
 
The new, post-2001 structural model consists of (1) – (3), (10) – (11), and 
 
 7
45E7 , F79 = ∗∗ >  ∗ ,           (4a) 
 
 <;4G< , F<9 = ∗∗ >  ∗ ,        (5a) 
 
 <;4G< , F<9 = H*IJ <  ? ,        (6a) 
 
 K=4L , L9 = ? ,         (6b) 
 
 7
@45E7 , F79 =  MINJ <  ?@ ,         (7a) 
 
and 
 
 K=@4L , 5̿9 = ?@ .         (7b) 
 
Equations (8) and (9) no longer hold in the new, non-Walrasian temporary general equilibrium with 
fixed domestic unskilled and skilled wage rates that are pegged at the pre-shock values, due to which 
quantity constraints emerge, as in Neary (1980) and DeLorme, Naqvi and WemhoQ ner (1995), among 
others. 
 
The solution of this second structural model is presented in Figures 5 – 8 below. Here UUnskilled and 
USkilled are the unemployment of American manufacturing and skilled workers, respectively. These are 
the persons who lost jobs as a consequence of the sudden and abrupt exposure of the American 
economy to the economies of China and India between 2000 and 2002. 
 
To see how the endogenous variable values are determined in the post-structural shock of the economy 
in general equilibrium of a very different nature, notice that from (4a), (5a), (6a) and (7a) the values of 
the four variables  F7 , F< , G<   and 5E7 are uniquely determined. 
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A heuristic explanation is that, once the politically imposed barriers to American capital investment in 
China and India were dropped in 2000 and 2001 respectively, a higher rate of return on capital r** 
could be earned, because of a lower unskilled wage rate in China wChina ,  and a lower skilled wage rate 
in India wIndia , some American capital started to flow to these two countries. This led to both some 
manufacturing and some IT businesses closing in the U.S., which, in turn, was associated with 
employment of smaller quantities of capital in the two sectors at home, in the amounts R7 and R< , as 
indicated in Figure 5 and Figure 6. 
 
With less productive capital employed in these two sectors, there occurs a fall in the marginal products, 
and therefore the values of marginal products, of unskilled labor in the manufacturing (import-
competing) sector, as well as of skilled labor in the IT services (export) sector of the American 
economy, simply because the two sets of inputs in these sectors are cooperative (positive cross partials 
of the production functions). From Figure 7 and Figure 8, we see leftward shifts of these values of 
marginal products curves for unskilled labor in the import-competing sector and of skilled labor in the 
export sector. 
 
Reduced employment of labor in these two sectors to G< and 5E7 leads, in the next round, as it were, to 
inward shifts of the values of marginal product curves for capital in Figure 5 and Figure 6, again 
because inputs are cooperative. Thus the final general equilibrium employment of productive capital in 
the two sectors falls to F7 and F<, as indicated in these two figures and in Equations (4a) and (5a). The 
amount of productive capital that flows to China is simply FH*IJ = 8< − F<, and the capital flow to 
India can be seen to be FMINJ = 87 − F7, so that SGT = FH*IJ +    FMINJis the aggregate productive 
capital flow from the U.S. to these two countries. It is also useful to define SN +  ST = S as the total 
amount of American-owned productive capital, of which SN is the amount employed at home, which is 
less than k. There is capital flight from the U.S. to China and India as long as r** > r*. 
 
Since 3< −  G< unskilled workers and 567 −  5E7 skilled workers lose jobs in the import-competing and 
the export sectors, respectively, in (11), the GNP of the country changes from D3  to 
 
 DG = 72G + <:F + K	R + ∗∗S = 4H*IJG< + ?L9 + 4MINJ5E7 + ?@5̿9 + ∗∗S  .  (11a) 
 
This is a subtle point that deserves explanation. In (11a), we have 2G = 
45E7 , F79 < 23 from (1) 
because of lower employment of both skilled labor and capital in the new temporary equilibrium. 
Similarly, from (2) we obtain :F = 
4G< , F<9 < :8  for similar reasons. Since American capital 
owners have a choice of employing Chinese unskilled workers in China or American unskilled workers 
in the U.S., in the import-competing sector the wage rate will have a tendency to converge to the 
Chinese unskilled wage rate. Similarly, Indian skilled workers in the IT services sector are substitutes 
for American skilled workers in the export sector as far as American capital owners are concerned, 
because of which this wage rate in the U.S. will also have a tendency to converge to the Indian skilled 
wage rate. 
 
Such is not the case, however, with the unskilled workers or the skilled workers in the non-traded 
sector in America. Therefore, in a temporary equilibrium with fixed prices and quantity constraints, 
there need not be such a strong tendency for convergence of these wage rates to the corresponding rates 
abroad, so that unemployment will have a tendency to emerge as a temporary equilibrium phenomenon 
at the pre-shock wage rates, thereby leading to the employment of L < 3 unskilled workers in the 
U.S., with &FUIVW))XN = L − G< of these workers becoming unemployed, because the short side of the 
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market always prevails in a temporary equilibrium with fixed prices and quantity constraints. This is 
displayed in Figure 7. Since this process is still underway, and has not reached completion yet, one 
should expect the unskilled unemployment rate to rise in the months and years to come. Of course, in a 
long-run Walrasian general equilibrium, the flood of unemployed workers – both skilled and unskilled 
– both wage rates will have to fall in the U.S., since the exposure to china and India is now a reality for 
Americans. 
 
By a similar argument, &F@W))XN = 5̿ − 5E7 skilled workers will become unemployed in the U.S., as 
indicated in Figure 8, again as a temporary equilibrium with fixed prices and quantity constraints. This 
process is also not complete yet. However, the numbers of skilled Indian substitute workers are far 
fewer in number, so that this process should be expected to be completed earlier. 
 
There is, however, another problem that the U.S. faces in the case of skilled workers. First, there is no 
actual shortage of demand for unskilled workers; if there were, why would skilled jobs be outsourced 
to India. It is merely that the American skilled workers have to get accustomed, in the long term, to 
working for lower salaries than they were used to in the pre-shock state of the economy. Second, as 
already noted, since only one out of every four high school graduates in the U.S. finishes college, 
getting educated takes years, and since the kind of new jobs that are created in America are of a skilled 
nature, in turn due to the American comparative advantage in innovation and R&D, the phenomenon of 
there being far too many unemployable American workers should also be expected to persist for a few 
years. This phenomenon will exhibit itself alongside the unemployment of that category of skilled 
workers for whom there are substitutes available in India. 
 
In any event, DG ≠ D3, L ≠ 3 , 5̿  ≠ 56 . Therefore, this, and the fact that with quantity constraints 
the price of the non-traded good, K, in the new non-Walrasian general temporary equilibrium is 
simply not, in general, the same as this price, ̂, in the initial, pre-structural-shock general 
equilibrium. To see this, note that (10) changes to 
 
  CE47 , < , K , DG9 =  	RK , ∗, ? , ?@, L , 5̿.        (10a) 
  
There is still the issue of an increase in interpersonal income inequality concomitantly with a positive 
rate of growth of real national income until 2008, and a contraction of this aggregate that is expected 
2009 onwards. The model presented so far is not capable of handling this issue. However, an extension 
is proposed in Appendix II that does indeed address this matter and the issues of aggregation and 
interpersonal comparability, both in the context of description (positive analysis) and in the context of 
developing policy prescription (inevitably a normative analysis).       
 
To compare the collective human wellbeing actually realized by the American people in the two 
general equilibria, all we have to now do is to specify a collective human well-being evaluation 
measure. Then we would be ready to solve for the value of this index in the pre- and post-structural- 
shock situations.20 
                                                           
20That is, for the phases both before and after the American economy was suddenly exposed to 2.3 billion people we can then ascertain the impact on the 
extent of realization of well-being of the American people, or lack thereof. The collective human well-being evaluation index I would adopt is  W = yα (1 – 
G)β  , where y is per capita income, G is the Gini coefficient of the interpersonal income distribution in the US, and α and β are non-negative 
parameters that embody the value judgment regarding how much weight in social evaluation should be given to distributive considerations and how much 
to the scale of average achievements. For an axiomatic derivation and for a persuasive justification of the use of this measure of collective human well-
being, see Sen (1976) and Naqvi (2008). Suffice it to say that this Collective Human Well-being Evaluation Measure is ordinally measurable. This measure 
incorporates the distributive value judgment of inverse interpersonal-income rank-order weights. Also, for β = 0, this index coincides with GDP, for a fixed 
population size, and thus GDP is a special case of this social evaluation index. 
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